

CDM 228: Lab 5

Rosiak

*This assignment is due Sunday 10/20 by noon, submitted through dropbox folder Lab 5 on D2L*

Answer all of the following three questions based on the reading for this week.

1. How do you think the **Prisoner's Dilemma** would change when regarded as a game played not *once*, but *many times*? (How will the strategies/reasoning change when players have a chance to build relationships over time and also consider longer-term strategies?) What do you think the *best strategy* for an individual player would be in this new version of the game? (Defend this with an argument.)

2. Describe the design for an original game that was similar to the Prisoner's Dilemma in form but had a different set of "payoffs," "punishments," and incentives to "cooperate." Describe what you would expect to learn about the players, and what values this might be instilling.

3. At first glance, one might think that Social Contract Theory could only demand that one always obey the law. However, as Rachels argues (in 6.4 on “Civil Disobedience”), Social Contract Theory in fact presents a “clear and forceful” argument *for* civil disobedience in many situations. Explain the reasoning behind such an argument.